I disagree with Charlie's assessment of Bismarck's nationalism. While it's true that his popular rhetoric framed nationalism as a popular, emergent phenomenon, his actual conception of the nation-state was far more artificial. His ambition was clearly to increase not only his own standing, but also the institution of the Prussian state that he would bequeath to the future. Had Bismarck been a populist statist, he might not have exercised the remarkable restraint that he did. "Bismarck belongs in the company of one of the rare leaders of mighty states who chose to limit his ambitions" (Kagan, On the Origins of War 101). Perhaps because Bismarck saw himself as so personally connected to the state he led, even though still a "caretaker" figure, he considered the state's long term welfare in his actions. For example, playing the populace against the opposition in his wars with Denmark and Austria diminished the credibility of his opposition. Bismarck recognized that the state's long-term health required at its core, despite all other asymmetries, a basic concord between ruler and ruled. In addition, he resisted the impulse to punish France severely in the Franco-Prussian war. While it engendered lingering animosity among the French, Bismarck's territorial reach or indemnity could have been far greater. It was to his credit that he chose to restrain himself there.
However, it was ultimately Prussia's military culture and economic prowess that allowed for Bismarck's success. All of a leaders cunning and guile come to naught if not backed by a powerful military and economic machine. Prussia's military tradition within the junkers produced a professional and well-disciplined army more than a match for any other European power, giving Bismarck the muscle he needed to secure a unified German empire.
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