pp. 754-762

One of Hegel's dialectics best explains the phenomenon of the nation-state in the second half of the 19th century. Napoelon III's reforms compromised the liberal desires of the middle class and (to a lesser extent) the working poor with the centralization conservatives desired. Essentially, a new status quo emerged whereby the 'thesis' of liberal, progressive revolution and the 'anti-thesis' of Restoration-era conservatism could coexist synthetically. Conservatism did not triumph outright through top-down nationalism (its survival required some concessions like legalizing trade unions and the like), but rather emerged a very different beast through the process of state-building. Gone was the nostalgic, Burkean attachment to royal houses and medieval traditions, replaced with the firm hand of the state as a newly created bulwark of the elite. 

The case of Italian unification is, for lack of a better term, a less revealing story. There are some interesting tidbits to be gleamed from the text, however. For one, Napoleon III's decision to withdraw from France's war with Austria-Hungary is striking for two reasons: first, he seemed unwilling to escalate the conflict for fear of its cost, and second, he feared the domestic consequences of the war. The former underpins the legacy of the Concert of Europe and the desire for international stability, while the latter emphasizes the compromise that lay beneath the new nation state (i.e. the emperor can't simply do as he pleases, for there are interest groups who check his power). No longer can a ruler claim that he is the state; rather, the state is now a discrete institution from the people it governs. The text quotes an anonymous Italian statesman observing, " 'We have made Italy; now we must make Italians.' " The division between the state and its people tellingly manifests the novelty of the nation-state as a political body.